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A COMMENT ON THE DEATH OF
LEMON
Richard S. Myers*
I believe Professor Michael S. Paulsen's paper makes an
important contribution to the necessary rethinking of the constitu-
tional law dealing with religion that has been underway for at least
the last decade.1 The other two commentators 2 have expressed
fundamental reservations about Professor Paulsen's basic approach.
I, too, have some important disagreements with his paper, but these
observations come from one who is basically in agreement with
much of what Professor Paulsen has voiced.3 Most of my remarks
reflect matters of emphasis that begin from what are, by and large,
shared premises.
This comment will make three basic points. The first point is
relatively narrow; the second and third are more sweeping, and I
have intentionally tried to express them in a way that will provoke
the sort of dialogue this symposium is attempting to advance. First,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. This
paper is a slightly revised version of the author's comments delivered on November 13,
1992 at Case Western Reserve University School of Law's Symposium on Religion and
the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman. The author would like to thank Mollie Murphy
and Stephen Safranek for their comments on an earlier version of this paper and John
Hnat for research assistance.
1. Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dea4 43 CASE W. Rss. L. REV. 795 (1993).
2. Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE'W. RES. L. REv. 865 (1993); Ira C.
Lupu, Which Old Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen's Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 883 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Richard S. Myers, Curriculum in the Public Schools: The Need for an
Emphasis on Parental Control, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 431 (1990) [hereinafter Myers, Cur-
riculum] (arguing that Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988), was wrongly decided); Richard S. Myers, The
Establishment Clause and Nativity Scenes: A Reassessment of Lynch v. Donnelly, 77 Ky.
LI. 61 (1988-89) [hereinafter Myers, Nativity Scenes] (Establishment Clause analysis ought
to focus on coercion); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of
Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19 (1991) [hereinafter Myers, Privatization] (the Supreme
Court's approach to the funding of religious education is in need of revision).
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although I agree with Professor Paulsen's focus on coercion in his
approach to the Establishment Clause,4 I disagree with him about
how such a test should work on the facts of Lee v. Weisman.' In
short, I think Weisman was wrongly decided, although, admittedly,
it is a very close question. Second, Professor Paulsen fails to come
to grips with a concern that those critical of Weisman have about
the outcome: that the Court is contributing to what has been called
the privatization of religion.6 That is, the effect of Weisman is to
contribute to a process that is all too familiar - banishing religion
from public life. I do not suggest that either Justice Kennedy or
Professor Paulsen has this goal in mind,7 but I fear that Justice
Kennedy's (and Professor Paulsen's) endorsement of a weak form
of the coercion test might further the privatization of religion. Such
a result is not to be applauded.' Third, Professor Paulsen neglects
to address directly the key question in debates about the govern-
ment and education - namely, whether the state or the family
should have the primary control over the education of our chil-
dren.9 There is much in his paper that is supportive of parental
rights, but he never directly focuses on the fundamental issue that
should orient our thinking about education issues.
I would like to address each issue in more detail. First, al-
though his emphasis on coercion is correct, Professor Paulsen does
not explain adequately why the facts of Weisman violate his coer-
4. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 3, at 97-106 (setting forth an approach to
the Establishment Clause that focuses on whether there exists an institutional relationship
between a particular -religious denomination and the goverment from which coercion is
likely to flow).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
6. See generally Myers, Privatization, supra note 3. See also Gerard V. Bradley,
Dogmatomachy - A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J 275, 277 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions "attempt[ ] to move
religion into the realm of subjective preference by eliminating religious consciousness");
Gerard V. Bradley, Tribe's "Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses," 4 BENCHMARK 137
(1990) (arguing against removing religion from public life).
7. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman expressly cautioned that "[a]
relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public life
could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution." Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661. Pro-
fessor Paulsen's discussion of the propriety of the public display of religious symbols
confirms that he does not intend to banish religion from public life. Paulsen, supra note
1, at 831 n.126.
8. I have argued this issue in detail elsewhere. See generally Myers, Privatization,
supra note 3.
9. See Myers, Curriculum, supra note 3, at 438-40 (parents should have the right to
determine what their children are taught).
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cion test.10 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Weisman turns on the
fact that students were required to attend and participate in a grad-
uation ceremony that included prayers." Most of Justice
Kennedy's opinion focused on the issue of participation and it was
on this point that the dissent struck some telling blows about the
majority's psycho-coercion test.'2 Professor Paulsen correctly re-
jects the participation portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion, but
tries to defend the result in Weisman by focusing on what he char-
acterizes as compelled attendance at "a religious worship ser-
ViCe." 1
3
Professor Paulsen's entire argument on coercion rests on this
characterization. If the characterization that Deborah Weisman was
compelled to attend a religious worship service is accepted, then
Professor Paulsen's argument is unassailable. Everyone agrees that
church attendance requirements violate the Establishment Clause. 4
The core example Professor Paulsen mentions - a requirement to
attend a Catholic mass 5 - would violate the Establishment
Clause, but, thankfully, there are no cases on point. Establishment
Clause cases arise in situations such as those in Weisman, where
there is usually little reason to accept the "religious worship ser-
vice" characterization.
Professor Paulsen's characterization fits a Baccalaureate Mass,
but does not fairly cover the graduation ceremony. Here, he makes
an error that is all too common in Establishment Clause case law
- he isolates the religious portion of the program, rather than
evaluating the government's overall conduct. 6 The brevity of the
prayers and the overall setting should affect how one characterizes
the event in question. The following factors, which argue against
Professor Paulsen's assessment, would seem relevant to the charac-
terization issue: the students were not in a church or other place of
worship, and there was no identifiable congregation in the sense of
10. I do agree that some form of coercion test is most desirable, even though there
will be hard questions at the margin, as our disagreement indicates.
11. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655, 2661.
12. Id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, 3., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 830-31.
14. See, e.g., Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Myers, Na-
rivity Scenes, supra note 3, at 107 n.220.
15. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 829.
16. See Myers, Privatization, supra note 3, at 40. Professor Paulsen does not make
this error when dealing with funding of religious education. Paulsen, supra note 1, at
858-59.
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a worship community (there was, for example, no necessary rela-
tionship between Rabbi Gutterman and the graduation audience);
the purpose of the event was to celebrate the graduation, not to
worship; and no institutional relationship existed between the
school and any religious denomination.
The error can perhaps be better seen by focusing on a point
raised by Justice Scalia. If including Rabbi Gutterman's prayers
violates the Establishment Clause, why doesn't including the Pledge
of Allegiance (which includes the phrase "One Nation, under God")
also violate the Establishment Clause? 7 Or, put differently, is a
graduation ceremony that includes the Pledge a religious worship
service? Another example raises the same problem: does every
session of the Supreme Court constitute a religious worship service
because the Marshal calls everyone to order with a short statement
that includes the words, "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court"? 8
It is unclear how Professor Paulsen would answer the "reli-
gious worship service" question in these situations, but his ap-
proach seems to be that the briefest inclusion of a religious ele-
ment in a public ceremony transforms the event into a religious
worship service. I simply do not agree with that basic characteriza-
tion. We need to be realistic about the differing impact of classic
church attendance requirements and the graduation ceremony in
Weisman, where there seems to be no contention that the
government's institutional weight is being thrown behind a particu-
lar religious denomination. Under Professor Paulsen's approach we
would be spending a lot of time trying to figure out if a public
event should be identified as a religious worship service. 9 This is
not a profitable inquiry. We would be better off focusing on the
actual effect the event has on religious liberty rather than making
everything turn on the definitional question.2"
17. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Professor Paulsen does not ad-
dress this point.
18. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 672 (1989) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part) (noting this practice).
19. This would be similar to the courts' focus on whether a symbol being displayed
by the government is religious or secular. See, e.g., Myers, Privatizadon, supra note 3, at
45 (discussing the definitional question in the context of the public display of religious
symbols); Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 3, at 109-10 (same).
20. A good place to start would be Justice Scalia's dissent on coercion. See Weisman,
112 S. Ct. at 2683-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to avoid extending the
concept of coercion beyond acts backed by a threat of penalty). See also Myers, Nativity
906 [Vol. 43:903
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This ties into my second point about the hazards of a weak
form of the coercion test. If a graduation ceremony that includes
the Pledge and every session of the Supreme Court violate the
Establishment Clause, then there is a real risk that this coercion
test could be used to further privatize religion. The consequence of
this form of the test might be to exclude any religious symbolism
from public life.
21
In a recent article, I examined the extent to which the privat-
ization thesis - the idea that religion is a private affair that should
not play a role in public life - has influenced constitutional doc-
trine involving the interaction between religion and the legal or-
der.' I discussed both the Establishment and Free Exercise Claus-
es and also substantive due process doctrine, which is not consid-
ered frequently in discussions of the privatization thesis. 23 I con-
Scenes, supra note 3, at 110 (arguing that avoiding a definitional inquiry "shifts the focus
from the character of the symbol to more substantive concerns, such as the institutional
relationships involved.").
21. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Paulsen supports this consequence. See
supra note 7. His test might lead to this result, however, depending on how one defined
"required to attend." Some have suggested that any government endorsement of religion is
coercive. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2664 n.6 ( Blackmun, J., concurring) ("As a practi-
cal matter, of course, anytime the government endorses a religious belief there will always
be some pressure to conform."); Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence:
The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8
(1986) (arguing that the names of cities such as Corpus Christi and Los Angeles and that
the National Motto ("In God We Trust") are unconstitutional).
22. Myers, Privatization, supra note 3. See also Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and
Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. AEV. 671, 682-93 (1992) (tracing the hostility to the
distinction between public and private life).
23. In the article:
[1] examine[d] the privatization thesis through a discussion of the Establishment
Clause and of substantive due process. In both contexts, religion is typically in-
volved in an explicitly public role. For example, many Establishment Clause
issues involve aid to religious institutions. The constitutional debate in these
cases often turns on whether it is permissible for the religious institution to
play an active role in performing a "public" task, such as education or child
care. The privatization thesis requires that institutions retaining their religious
character be denied direct government support. Similarly, in the context of
substantive due process it is important to determine the appropriate role of re-
ligiously influenced moral principles in public decisionmaking on such issues as
abortion and homosexual conduct. Here, the privatization thesis works in two
ways. First, religiously influenced moral judgments are not taken into account
in support of the constitutionality of legislation because such judgments do not
constitute "secular" interests that the government may advance. Second, reli-
giously influenced moral judgments are viewed as dispositive of the case
against the constitutionality of legislation because it violates the Establishment
Clause for "religious" views to be embodied in secular legislation.
Myers, Privatization, supra note 3, at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
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cluded that the privatization thesis had indeed influenced some of
the Justices, but that the theory was virtually dead in both Religion
Clause and substantive due process cases. I also warned that be-
cause our culture has moved in the direction of privatized religion,
the privatization thesis would likely resurface in the next genera-
tion 4 To my great surprise, the next generation may well have
arrived when the Court decided Lee v. Weisman and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey26 in late June, 1992. These cases may well
indicate the reemergence of the privatization thesis.27 I believe
that Professor Paulsen should have addressed that aspect of
Weisman.
It is not clear that Justice Kennedy's view in Weisman accepts
the complete exclusion of religious symbolism from public life.2"
It may be that his opinion is limited to the public school context,
where the Court has, for good reason, long been the most
separationst.29 Weak forms of the coercion test do, however, run
the risk of completely excluding religious symbolism from public
life,3" and Professor Paulsen needs to be attentive to this phenom-
enon.
A more detailed explanation of why the exclusion of religious
symbols from public life is a bad idea will help to clarify this
point. Many view religious symbolism in public life as inherently
coercive. 31 Justice Scalia defended public prayer in Weisman by
focusing on such prayer's value in guarding against religious bigot-
ry and prejudice.32 Religious symbolism in public life serves an-
24. Id. at 80.
25. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
26. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (upholding the right to an abortion, but placing a number
of limitations on the exercise of that right).
27. See generally Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Religion Clauses, in
No. 25 ESSAYS ON OUR TIMEs SERIES (Free Congress Foundation, forthcormng 1993).
28. See supra note 7.
29. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658 (emphasizing that "there are heightened concerns with
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and
secondary public schools.") See also Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 3, at 108 n.225;
Myers, Privatization, supra note 3, at 51 n.174. Cf, Laycock, supra note 21, at 8.
30. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Religion in Public Life - Reasons for Minimal Ac-
cess, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 633, 641-43 (1992); Douglas Laycock, Summary and Syn-
thesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 841, 843-44 (1992).
32. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2685-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent also
rejects the privatization theory. Id at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Myers, Privat-
izauon, supra note 3, at 47-58 (discussing another example of Justice Scalia's rejection of
the privatization theory).
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other benefit: rather than view religious symbols in public life as
an exercise in religious domination, we ought to view most such
displays as acts of humility. Through such displays, the government
recognizes that there is an authority beyond the state. This recogni-
tion provides important support for the idea of limited government
and the preservation of individual freedom. Will Herberg captured
this point eloquently nearly 30 years ago:
[W]e should understand from our theological and political
traditions, [that] a society, and the state through which it is
organized politically, remain "legitimate," "righteous" and
"lawful" only insofar as they recognize a higher majesty
beyond themselves, limiting and judging their pretensions.
Once the state forgets or denies this, once it sets itself up
as its own highest majesty, beyond which there is nothing,
it becomes totalitarian: in effect, it divinizes itself, and
thereby ceases to be a "legitimate" state in the theological
understanding of the term. Therefore, the "established or-
der" - the state, above all - ought to include within
itself signs, symbols, and ceremonials constantly reminding
itself and the people that it is subject to a majesty beyond
all earthly majesties. That is the indispensable function of
religious symbols and ceremonials in public life, one that
no responsible theologian, however resentful he may be of
trivialization and superficiality in religion, can afford to
forget.33
Public displays of religious symbols, including Rabbi
Gutterman's prayers, thus express the view that our nation is - as
the Pledge of Allegiance states - "under God" and subject to a
transcendent order. This view has roots deep in our American
traditions, as the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg
Address attest. Public displays of religious symbols underscore the
idea that the health of a political community depends on its ac-
knowledgement that there are "at least a minimum of objectively
established rights not granted by way of social conventions, but
antecedent to any political system of law."34
This view is really essential to the preservation of true free-
dom.35 The relentless exclusion of religious symbols from public
33. Will Herberg, Religion and Public Life, NAT'L REv., July 30, 1963, at 61.
34. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Doctrinal Document on Threats to Life Proposed, 20
ORIGINS 755, 757 (1991).
35. See id. See also Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, 21 ORIGINS 1, 17 (1991)
1993]
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life thus may contribute to turning our democracy into an "open or
thinly disguised totalitarianism." 36  This may seem extreme, but
one way to measure this is to examine the extent to which our
society has respect for human life. There is, I believe, a connection
between the privatization tendencies of Weisman' and the moral
bankruptcy of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which explicitly rests
on the view that there are no moral norms external to the individu-
al.37 It ought to have been less surprising, therefore, that the jus-
tices who joined in Weisman made up the majority in Casey, ad-
vancing the view that the state cannot prohibit abortions at any
time during pregnancy. 3 According to one of the twentieth
century's most influential theologians: "The ultimate root of all at-
tacks on human life, is the loss of [a belief in] God [and in a
transcendent order]. Where [this belief] disappears, the absolute
dignity of human life disappears as well."39
The privatization thesis, therefore, has real risks. Although there
("It must be added that totalitarianism arises out of a denial of truth in the objective
sense. If there is no transcendent truth, in obedience to which man achieves his full iden-
tity, then there is no sure principle for guaranteeing just relations between people."). See
generally'JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS viii-ix (1960) (stressing the impor-
tance of the idea of objective truth in promoting human dignity and freedom).
36. Pope John Paul II, supra note 35, at 18.
37. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. For additional discussion of this aspect of Casey, see
Russell Hittinger, What Really Happened in the Casey Decision: Et Tu, Justice Kennedy?,
CRISIS, September 1992, at 16; Myers, supra note 27. Cf. Myers, Privatization, supra note
3, at 71 (discussing this feature of certain substantive due process opinions).
38. Robert H. Bork has addressed this issue:
Both Casey and Weisman bespeak a willingness to ignore the actual principles
of the Constitution in order to enact a liberal cultural agenda. Both rest on ex-
treme principles of individual autonomy. Both display strong elements of senti-
mentality as an engine of Constitution-rewriting. Both, contrary to the historical
Constitution, reject the concerns of the community for a simplistic and unre-
flective individualism so characteristic of elite opinion in this age.
Robert H. Bork, Beside the Law, NAT'L REV., October 19, 1992, at 38, 41.
39. Ratzinger, supra note 34, at 758. Cardinal Ratzinger further discussed human life:
[A] state which arrogates to itself the prerogative of defining which hu-
man beings are or are not the subject of rights and which consequently grants
to some the power to violate others' fundamental right to life, contradicts the
democratic ideal to which it continues to appeal and undermines the very foun-
dations on which it is built. By allowing the rights of the weakest to be violat-
ed, the state also allows the law of force to prevail over the force of law. One
sees, then, that the idea of an absolute tolerance of freedom of choice for some
destroys the very foundation of a just life for men together. The separation of
politics from any natural content of right, which is the inalienable patrimony of
everyone's moral conscience, deprives social life of its ethical substance and
leaves it defenseless before the will of the strongest.
Id. at 757. See also MURRAY, supra note 35, at 28.
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are obviously limits to the measures the state may take to empha-
size the notion that the nation is under God, I do not believe those
limits were transgressed in Weisman.
40
The third point of this comment is that Professor Paulsen ne-
glects to address directly the key question in debates about the
government and education, namely, whether the state or the family
should have the primary control over the education of our chil-
dren.4 t Commendably, he does focus on some questions that touch
on this issue (in particular his discussion of funding of religious
schoolse2), but we need to get the key question directly on the
table. Discussions of how much religion we can include or must
exclude from the public schools can create the illusion that we can
solve the problems posed by public education and can also risk
obscuring the broader issue of whether the state or the family
should have the ultimate responsibility over the education of our
children.
Our history demonstrates that we cannot solve the problem of
public education without some radical rethinking of the issues. We
have had problems since the government began to assume responsi-
bility for education in the first half of the nineteenth century. The
school wars of the 1840s in New York illustrate that problems of
the sort discussed in this symposium have been with us for quite
some time. In the 1840s, the Catholic Bishop in New York City
complained (correctly I might add) that the state-funded schools
were biased against Catholics and began a lengthy, but ultimately
unsuccessful, fight for a share of the common school funds to
support the Catholic schools. The striking similarity between this
fight 150 years ago and the current discussion of voucher schemes,
which is driven in part by a rejection of the educational philosophy
of the public schools, suggests that there is no easy solution to the
dilemma.43
We have had a more or less stable set of affairs for most of
the history of public schools. The public schools have been basical-
40. I would agree with Justice Scalia's conclusion that "[to] deprive our society of that
important unifying mechanism, in order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the
minimal inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as
senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law." Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2686 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
41. See Myers, Curriculum, supra note 3, at 438-40 (discussing the fact that "textbook
battles" are not unique to the present era).
42. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 858.
43. Myers, Curriculum, supra note 3 at 432.
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ly Protestant schools for most of their history." Those parents
who were unhappy with this and who had the means could avoid
public schools altogether. The Constitution did not play much of a
role in these debates until the Court incorporated the Religion
Clauses in the middle of this century.45 The school prayer cases
of thirty years ago46 accelerated the move to a secular - as op-
posed to Protestant - government school system.
Most of the current Establishment Clause battles in the public
school context are attempts to ensure that all traces of religion are
banished from the schools.4 7 These are important issues, because
there is a very real risk of coercion in the public school setting.
Professor Paulsen demonstrates that, if anything, the courts have
gone too far in trying to keep religion out of the public schools -
even in situations where a proper view of the constitutional rights
of teachers or students would have led to a different result.
48
Discussing these issues, however, is basically a sideshow. Dis-
cussing them leads to the illusion that we can indeed solve the
problems posed by our current system of public education. I do not
think we can. Excluding all traces of religion from the public
schools does not resolve the issue - although it may eliminate
Establishment Clause problems as long as we do not view secular
humanism as a religion.49 But eliminating Establishment Clause
44. Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out': Assimilation, In-
doctrination, and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REv. 581, 638 n.322
(1993) (noting that parochial schools grew as a result of the domination of public schools
by Protestant teachers); John E. Coons, School Choice as Simple Justice, FIRST THINGS,
April 1992, at 15- 16 ("Until yesterday it was also the practice of our schools to force
dissenting and nonbelieving children of the poor to behave like Protestants.").
45. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
46. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that the
state cannot require that passages from the Bible be read in public schools even if indi-
vidual students could be excused upon parental request); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (holding that state officials could not compose an official state prayer and require
that it be recited daily in public schools).
47. See, e.g., Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 3025 (1992) (upholding a school principal's directive to a teacher to remove two
religiously-oriented books and to discontinue reading the Bible while school was in ses-
sion). The effort to banish religion from schools has largely succeeded. For example, there
seems to be general agreement that public school textbooks ignore the role of religion in
American society. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 870 (1988); Myers, Curriculum, supra note 3, at 431.
48. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 850-56.
49. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd,
827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the contention that textbooks advanced secular
[Vol. 43:903
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issues does not in any way eliminate the impact of public schools
on religious liberty.
Neutrality in the public schools is not possible. 0 Excluding
religion from public education can interfere with religious liberty in
two significant ways. It sends the message that religion is unimpor-
tant or that it is possible to draw a sharp distinction between the
spiritual and the temporal orders." It ignores reality to think that
this message does not have an effect. The principal virtue of Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion in Weisman is that it acknowledges the
coercive aspects of public schools.52 If Rabbi Gutterman's prayers
are coercive, then the entire curriculum of our public schools must
be coercive. There is no way to eliminate that problem within the
existing framework.
Most of the debates we have about how much religion we can
include or must exclude from the public schools risk obscuring the
real issue of whether the state or the family should have the ulti-
mate responsibility for the education of our children. The real
problem is that there are not enough candid discussions of the
central issues at stake. As one commentator has noted in defending
the current concept of public education:
[T]he entire concept of compulsory education is based on
the assumption that there are times when the state rather
than the parent may decide what perspectives the child
confronts. Although society normally assumes that parents
are best able to determine and do what is best for their
child, compulsory education traditionally has been justified
as a mechanism to expose children to ideas that will enable
them to advance beyond the home and transcend the preju-
dices of the past. To compel education, especially education
under state control or supervision, is to assert that the state
- rather than parents - ultimately should decide what is
humanism, even assuming that secular humanism is a religion).
50. See Myers, Curriculum, supra note 3, at 432 & n.6.
51. Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV.
146, 162 (1986) ("Studious silence on a subject that parents may say touches all of life
is an eloquent refutation."); see also John C. Murray, A Common Enemy, A Common
Cause, FIRST THINGS, October 1992, at 29, 36 ("Mhe sheer omission of religion from
public schools creates a pressure on the child against religion, and puts a constraint on
him to believe that what is not important to be taught in school is not important at all.").
52. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992) ("[T]here are heightened concerns
with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and
secondary public schools.").
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best for children. 3
This is the issue we need to debate.
I think we typically decide this key question in advance by
assuming that state education is the norm - and that any conces-
sions to parental rights ought to be reserved for fringe groups, such
as the Amish.' We assume that state control of education is the
baseline and that exceptions ought to be narrow because they
threaten the public schools, which the Supreme Court has charac-
terized as the very symbol of our democracy. 55
We should reverse the presumption. The venerable notion of
subsidiarity has much to contribute to this debate. According to the
principle of subsidiarity,
[a] community of a higher order should not interfere in the
internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the
latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case
of need and help to coordinate its activity with the activi-
ties of the rest of society, always with a view to the com-
mon good. 6
Under this view, we begin with the presumption that intermediate
communities, such as the family or religious groups, have the
primary responsibility for tasks such as education. State action
should be supportive of parental decisions regarding education, and
state intervention in ways inconsistent with parental choices should
only be justified in narrow cases when the intermediate community
has demonstrated a serious inability to discharge its responsibility.
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The most desirable solution would be some sort of voucher system,
so that the option to avoid the public schools would be available
to all, not just the wealthy. Of course, parents sometimes make
mistakes. But the risk of error should not always weigh in on the
side of state power.'
The whole system of public education (with the grudging con-
cession given to private education 8) needs to be challenged as a
violation of parental rights. Professor Paulsen makes some strong
arguments that are supportive of the necessary rethinking,59 but he
would do well to go even further and focus directly on the fun-
damental question.
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